Compressed air systems convert electrical work energy to pneumatic work energy at the point of use. All elements of this process need to be managed efficiently. The optimum process would produce one unit of work energy in the form of expanded mass at the point of use for every 8.5 units of compressor input energy. In industrial plant air systems, which represent more than 7.5 percent of the energy used in U. S. industry, there seems to be little understanding or effort made to achieve any level of efficiency other than the occasional attempt to buy the promise of efficiency with new equipment.

The manner in which compressed air is consumed offers a major opportunity for reduced energy and operating costs. Typically, less than 60 percent of the total compressed air consumed contributes directly to the goods and services for which production was intended. Of this 60 percent, more than a third of it is poorly applied.

The net result is that less than 40 percent of the total consumption of compressed air in industrial plants is essential to process results. The balance negatively influences the cost and quality of goods and services produced. The combination of process efficiency and usage of compressed air makes plant compressed air systems one of the most significant economic opportunities in the industrial sector. Despite this reality, compressed air energy has been increasing while the use of all other forms of energy in industry is diminishing.

Audit results
In the past five years, Plant Air Technology has thoroughly audited plant and process compressed air systems at 551 plants and cumulatively analyzed the audit results of 250 systems. The percentage of total energy used for compressed air in these plants ranged from 6-29 percent, with an average of 9.5 percent. This article will report the findings. It is particularly interesting to note that while most plant managers were aware of potential inefficiencies, the questions of how the system was specifically set up and adjusted and why it was operated the way it was went unasked and unanswered.

Most of the operating personnel in these plants did not know how much compressed air volume they used or needed. They did not know the costs of operating the compressed air system. Only two of these plants monitored both input power and compressed air consumed. There were no standards or operating procedures for the use or supply of compressed air other than maintaining a minimum acceptable result. Generally, success in system operation was determined by the lack of complaints.

The majority of operating personnel acknowledged that their education regarding compressed air systems and their operation was lacking. Most of the audited facilities did not know how their equipment was specifically adjusted and admitted that outside sources maintained the equipment and established equipment operating parameters. In all cases, neither the owner nor the service agency had any records of how or why the equipment was adjusted. The utility costs ranged from a blended rate including demand charges of 0.035 cent-0.117 cent/kW of electricity consumed.

Low load or no load tests were performed at all audit locations in advance of the final audit. All operating conditions were investigated. All parts of the system including supply, storage, distribution, and demand were measured. Problems in the system were evaluated and quantified. Operating costs of the audited systems were determined including all ancillary equipment, maintenance, water, operator costs, and depreciation. Proposed solutions were detailed and costed. Operating cost of the proposed system was determined to establish a return on investment.

Demand side energy
The basics of demand side energy will be covered here. Future articles will discuss usage factors that affect demand and supply side energy issues.

Most systems are evaluated based on perceived supply requirements. If the pressure anywhere in the system is below what is believed to be the minimum, the diagnosis is insufficient supply. Little more is done to determine what is going on in the system. In existing systems, demand is determined by adding up the rated capacity of the compressors that are on regardless of power. An "on" compressor is only an indication of cost, not an indication of need.

Without demand, there is no requirement for supply. Figuring out a reasonable needs profile begins by analyzing demand. All of these systems used air at the pressure it was compressed to with little or no storage and an uncontrolled approach toward expanding the air to the pressure needed. Less than half of the air consumed was regulated. Fifty percent of the regulators were adjusted wide open.

Total unregulated demand is typically 80 percent of the total demand. This creates a unique dynamic not seen in other utilities. As real demand increases, the supply pressure drops and 80 percent of the total use volume diminishes proportional to the reduced density of the supply air. Please keep this in mind as we move forward.

Demand categories for compressed air include:

Appropriate production use—compressed air that is well applied and controlled at the pressure of its intended use. This can include coincidental demand, critical pressure, high rate of flow, and high volume users, which provoke the operating philosophy in the manner that they affect the system and its pressure. A portion of the users necessary to production will be regulated, while the balance will be unregulated.

Inappropriate production use—applications that should use electricity, hydraulics, or mechanical power instead of compressed air. Examples include using plant air for aspiration, agitation, or aeration; using air ejectors in place of a simple vacuum; or using air instead of electric vibrators. These compressed air applications are usually developed with no understanding of cost or the consequences of purchasing alternative equipment to perform the same function.

Open blowing—using plant air for moving product, drying, wiping, cooling, or part and scrap ejection instead of using pressure blowers, knock outs, or specialty nozzles which would have to be purchased and applied.

Drainage—using plant air in conjunction with open valves, notched ball valves, or motorized or solenoid-operated drain valves to dispose of compressed air effluent such as water or lubricant instead of automatic drain traps which do not use compressed air.

Leaks—waste, which is internal to production equipment as well as in the general piping system from the internals of a compressor to the point of use.

Artificial demand—the excess volume of air that is created for unregulated users as a result of supplying higher line pressure than necessary for the application. This includes all previously unregulated consumption including appropriate and inappropriate production use, open blowing, and leaks. As the pressure supplying all uses fluctuates, artificial demand increases and decreases from a minimum to a maximum waste level. As real production demand decreases and the pressure rises, artificial demand increases. As leaks in the system are fixed, the pressure rises and all unregulated demand increases proportionate to the pressure rise including the balance of the leaks. The use of a demand expander can correct this problem when adjusted to the minimum required pressure. It will allow storage to be maintained in the supply system to handle variations in demand.

Attrition—additional air consumption for applications as a result of unmanaged wear. Examples include blast nozzles, textile machinery nozzles, etc. Unattended attrition can increase this consumption by 50 percent volumetrically and frequently provokes the increase in pressure at both the point of use and at the supply. A ½-in. nozzle with 1/16 in. wear that has been elevated from 80 to 90 psig will increase the volume by 50 percent.

Purge air from desiccant dryers—air consumed in the process of stripping air dryers of moisture. This process can range from 3-18.5 percent of the total air system capacity from one dryer type to another. There are specialty categories of air such as CDA 100 that is used in the microelectronics industry where purge can approach 25 percent of total capacity for the system.

Centrifugal compressor blow off—when the demand for air in the system is below the minimum stable mass flow for centrifugal compressors. These compressors will blow off the difference between the minimum stable flow and the actual demand requirement. It is common that all centrifugals installed in an application can be blowing off simultaneously. Depending on the design of the compressor, the current limit low adjustment, and the inlet conditions, the minimum stable flow can range from 60-87 percent of the full load capacity. This is real demand that requires energy whether it is productive or not. The objective in operating a centrifugal compressor should be to keep it fully loaded in base load and operating on its natural curve.

Bleed air or control bypass—a point-of-use consumption where air is bled off the system or bypasses an application to improve the accuracy of pressure and/or flow control. Where pressure accuracy is important and there is considerably more power and/or higher than needed pressure, the pressure will fluctuate erratically or perturbate. This is usually the result of compensating for a controls or storage problem. The most common use of bleed air or bypass is in simulation testing such as in the aerospace industry.

In general, these 10 items represent the constituents of demand that were encountered in the audited systems. The last four categories were represented in only 23 percent of all systems while the others were typical constituents.

Audit conclusions
Demand is the most misunderstood part of the compressed air system. Compressed air mass does the work. Only a few plants used mass to determine the work energy and related supply needed to accomplish their desired results. The majority used volume and pressure in a separate context. There are no standard guidelines for the use of compressed air. Without information or education, none of this is perceived to be a problem because it cannot be defined or quantified.

The audit showed an average cost of $1.66/100 cfm/hr of operation based on an average use pressure of 96 psig that was the same as supply. On a three-shift, five-day-a-week basis, the application of a ¼ in. open blowing device at 90 psig costs $9834/year to operate.

In all of the plants audited, anyone could make this application decision with no discussion or knowledge of the consequences. If this application requires the addition or loading of another compressor, the cost could increase by 10 times.

Most of the audited plants currently have an air committee and have developed standards for the use of compressed air. They also have applied standards for allowable differentials at all applicable points from one end of the system to the other. They view the addition of compressed air users to the system as a business decision (as it should be).

The average demand reduction in these plants was 43 percent although this is an on-going process. The average demand pressure requirement has been reduced by 12 psig and many feel they can reduce this further. The average savings per year including all costs of compressed air has been more than $400,000.* The average return on investment—adjusted for tax treatment, cost of capital, and adding depreciation for capital—was 16 months.

The tough question to ask in these plants is how much production revenue must be generated annually in order to do nothing. Because this is bottom-line expense and directly impacts on operating income, the answer is the potential savings times the production revenue divided by the pretax profit. The average plant making 5 percent pretax profit would need $8 million/yr to ignore the $400,000/yr operating cost reduction. This certainly does not make production at any cost a sound reason for having a poorly operated and configured plant air system. MT

*Plant Air Technology has audited more than 860 medium to large industrial compressed air systems. The average system of the 250 discussed in this article has 1485 bhp of on-line power. The size of the system and the burdened cost of energy, water, and maintenance will influence the potential savings.

R. Scot Foss is president of Plant Air Technology, P.O. Box 470467, Charlotte, NC 28247; telephone (704) 844-6666. He is the author of "The Compressed Air Systems Solution Series," 1994, Bantra Publishing; telephone (704) 372-3400.

A company which we will call Omega Foods (not its real name) was expanding its business rapidly, and had announced plans for a major rollout of a new series of products that would be introduced into several existing, as well as a few new, distribution channels. This rollout would require significantly increased production at Omega's Schnitzel plant (not its real name either). After reviewing historical performance, production capacities at the plant's bottleneck, staffing levels, raw materials suppliers, and so on, Schnitzel's plant manager concluded that they could accommodate the added production demand.

Unfortunately, the plant was now into its third month of production preparing for the rollout, and was already nearly a month behind in the inventory levels needed to support Omega's objectives. On review, the bottleneck—originally thought to be the extrusion process—was actually at packaging. The packaging line was significantly over-designed and had an instantaneous capacity rating of 50 units per minute, or more than twice what was needed to support the rollout.

But it was producing only an average of about 10 units per minute per shift, with the actual rate varying wildly from day to day, and never more than 20 units per minute. And, as you might expect, downtime levels were exceptionally high. The prevailing opinion was that the packaging line was very unreliable and the maintenance manager was taking considerable heat over the line's performance. A common refrain was "Couldn't he and his staff just—fix it—right?"

Coincidentally, Omega was having a manufacturing excellence audit done at all its plants, applying principles of reliability and lean manufacturing. At the Schnitzel plant, one of the primary areas for applying these principles was the packaging line.

Adapting FMEA methods
In analyzing the problems at the packaging line, the technique applied was one adapted from failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) methods, or, perhaps more properly, reliability centered maintenance (RCM) methods. Since insufficient information was available about the causes for production losses, other than anecdotes and "swags" at the nature of the problems, the plant had to be more structured in its analysis. In this case the adaptation of FMEA/RCM methods was to look at the packaging line as a business system, and to define a functional failure of the system as anything which resulted in production losses. A cross-functional team was assembled that consisted of two operators (senior and junior), two maintenance technicians (electrical and mechanical), an engineer, a packaging line vendor representative, and a maintenance supervisor.

The cross-functional team was introduced to reliability and lean manufacturing principles, as well as RCM and total productive maintenance (TPM) principles, during an initial workshop. This was followed with a group exercise where the following questions were posed:

• What are the major failure modes which result in production losses? Note: these were analyzed one at a time.
• What is the approximate frequency of occurrence of each? Guesses were OK, but we had to get general agreement among the cross-functional team, and occasionally did some external validation of initial estimates.
• For each failure, what is the approximate typical consequence or effect on lost production per year in hours? And/or tons? And/or gross profit?
• Are there any extraordinary repair costs for each of these failure modes?
• What are the potential causes of these failures? Note that at this point we did not want to do a root cause analysis, but rather to make a list of potential causes for later analysis.
• Can we detect onset of these failures to help avoid them, or better manage them?

With this information in hand we developed preliminary priorities as to which of these failures to address most urgently, i.e., those resulting in the greatest production loss.

Applying TPM principles
We also began to apply TPM principles by asking the following questions of the cross-functional team relative to each of the significant failure modes:

• Does any of the equipment on the line require restoration to like-new condition?
• What operator care and PM practices do we need to establish, e.g., inspection, calibration, condition monitoring, lubrication, or other basic care, to avoid or better manage these problems?
• What maintenance PM practices do we need to establish, e.g., inspection, predictive maintenance or condition monitoring, calibration, lubrication, or other basic care, to avoid or better manage these problems?
• Are there any specific maintenance prevention actions that we need to take in terms of modified operating or maintenance practices, design issues, etc.?
• Do we need to do any additional training of operators or maintenance technicians to help avoid failures?
• How do we measure our success?

Coincidentally, one simple measure which indicated our success was the number of bags of product shipped compared to the number of bags consumed per month. The difference represented how well the packaging line was performing relative to ideal. The discarded bags were also a very high percentage of the cost of manufacturing the product.

Cleaning, inspecting, and restoring
Before proceeding with any further analysis, we did a "clean, inspect, and restore" effort on the packaging line in light of what we had learned in reviewing the various production failure modes, their consequences, potential causes, and potential actions for operators and maintainers. This effort followed TPM principles, and is similar to detailing a car.

We first had to think through the logistics of the cleaning effort, and assemble our cleaning tools, e.g., vacuum cleaner, rags, solvents, etc. Then the team cleaned the machine superbly, inspecting it for anything it thought might be creating a problem, e.g., loose bolts, miscentered guides, belts off track, dirty grease fittings, etc. The cleaning and inspection was done with the failure modes in mind. In doing this we found many things that could be corrected immediately, often as a team. Some problems required formal work orders for later implementation, and still other things required design modifications, training, better procedures, or changes by suppliers.

As we were cleaning and inspecting the packaging line, we found the following situations, for which a "hit list" was kept by the operators and technicians and consolidated by the maintenance supervisor.

1. The tare weight control had been severely contaminated with product, making it very unreliable. It had not been calibrated in some time, and was not on any routine calibration preventive maintenance (PM). Operators had been regularly bypassing the "interrupt signal" resulting from load cell faults in order to avoid stopping production, and there was a lot of pressure not to stop production. But this bypassing was resulting in over and under fills, routine minor stops, and product buildup, which in turn often slowed or stopped the entire production line.

2. The bag magazine had bent loading racks resulting in improper alignment of the bags and jamming. Photo eyes and reflectors on the bag magazine were also in need of alignment to avoid fault readings and minor stoppages.

3. The two cutter/trimmers for the bag tops were different types, had different settings and different springs, and were gummed up with lacquer from the bags. Apparently improper spares and/or training had led to the use of different parts for the cutters, resulting in different settings to make them work, and no routine PM had been established for cleaning the cutters or replacing them when they were worn. Nor was there any standard calibration setting for the different style bags in use. Each was rigged daily to make it work, and a lot of lube spray was used to keep the cutting edges from sticking. The result was non-squared cuts, improper folds, poor glue lines, and generally a lot of rejected product. But pressure was so high to run the production line that downtime to correct this problem was not allowed.

4. Lacquer rubbing off the bags and accumulating at major wear points was a general problem throughout the production line, resulting in increased friction and routine jamming, but there were no routine operator or maintenance PMs for cleaning the lacquer to avoid this problem.

5. The glue pot was set 10 deg F too high, and the glue nozzles had accumulated dried glue, all of which resulted in improper glue lines and bonding, and rejected product.

6. The mechanical spreading "fingers" were not properly set, and one set was bent and had a bad sleeve bearing, resulting in improper spreading and thence folding, and therefore gluing, and frequent rejected product.

7. Several of the cams that control the advancement of the bags and other settings were caked with grease, resulting in progressively deteriorating settings as the bags moved down the packaging line, increasing the probability of jamming.

8. Several guides were bent and/or misaligned, and bolts were loose or missing, resulting in misplacement of bags for packaging, increasing the probability of jamming.

9. Several chains were loose, resulting in a jerking motion as packaging progressed.

10. Several bearings were worn out, and/or unlubricated, under lubricated, or over lubricated.

11. The palletizer had photocells and reflectors misaligned or broken, limit switches that were not calibrated, loose chains, and a faulty solenoid. Additional influencing factors included poor conveyor tracking and poor knockdown bar and shrink wrap settings.

In addition, further discussion suggested the following:

1. Bag specifications and bag quality were a problem. Marketing had insisted on a highly varied mix of colors, lacquer coatings, thicknesses, and sizes to target specific markets and customers. This was all well and good, except the bag supplier was often unable to meet the bag specifications for each, resulting in spats of jamming, rapid lacquer buildup from rubbing of the bags along the line, inadequate bonding of the glue due to excess lacquer on the bags, etc.

2. Related to bag variety were additional internal factors in that there were no specific settings for the line for each product type. As a result, changeovers and startups after a shutdown tended to be a hit or miss effort. Run it, try it, if it doesn't work, try a new setting until you get something that does work. Of course some operators were better at this than others. And the production plan changed regularly to meet the revised perception of market demand. In one instance we spent two hours starting up a production run, and were able to achieve only 36 bags of product, something we should have been able to do in 10 minutes, not 120 minutes.

3. The hopper feeding the packaging machine appeared to be undersized for the duty now required by the rollout, resulting in inconsistent feed rates.

4. There were considerable differences between shifts as to exactly how each operator ran the packaging line. Given the lack of standards and the poor condition of the equipment, this was not surprising. Each operator was trying to accommodate the faults in the machine along with an extensive number of product types, leading to a wide range of operating practices.

Or, as the saying goes, "Other than this, everything was running pretty good!"

The results
As we were cleaning, we managed to correct many of these problems on the spot, e.g., re-calibrate the tare weight control, align the bag magazine, reset and calibrate all the photocells and reflectors, clean the lacquer buildup, reset the glue pot temperature and clean the nozzles, clean the cams, tighten the chains, and so on. Other efforts required a work order and spare parts, e.g., restoring the cutters and folders to like-new condition and replacing certain bearings. Still other things required additional engineering review, e.g., the hopper size and rates; PM requirements, including new procedures, training, and schedules for PM; and the development of specific settings on the line for packaging various products.

In just two short days—one day of review and analysis and another day of cleaning, inspecting, and restoring—we doubled production output. While it was momentarily painful for the plant and production managers to take the packaging line out of production, it was essential to identify and solve the problems that had been identified.

However, this was just the beginning. We now had to develop and agree to:

• A specific operator care and PM program, one which involved operators doing basic care activities—tighten, lubricate, clean, calibrate, and monitor—to avoid or detect developing problems. One point to be stressed is that the operators had to own the reliability of the equipment, much the same as we own the reliability of our cars. To do otherwise is like expecting mechanics at the garage to own the reliability of our cars—they can't and won't. Mechanics can help with diagnosis, repairs and restoration, PM, and so on, but we have to own the reliability of our cars.
• A specific maintenance PM program, one which involved the maintenance techniciansrestoring the assets to like-new condition, assuring consistency and adequacy of spares, doing loop calibrations, planning for shutdowns and startups, doing the more difficult and/or intrusive PM, and generally working with the operators to assure reliability and manufacturing excellence in the packaging line. Note that the two PM programs were actually one program developed and agreed upon by operations and maintenance.
• A specific set of instructions for the PM program, one which included taking digital pictures of each PM area, adding arrows/circles, instructions, key steps, cautions, and so on. This PM instruction set was to be kept near each machine for ease of use by operators and maintenance technicians.
• A specific manual of setup instructions for each area of the line for each of the different products packaged in each type of bag, i.e., for each stock keeping unit (SKU). Each area would have specific settings for each SKU, which would be used for all changeovers as the reference point. Each shift would be required to follow the same settings and procedures, or to log and justify the reason for not following the settings. Settings would be upgraded with improvements and changes to SKUs.
• A training program to train all the operators and maintenance technicians in the proper PM, operation, maintenance, and setups for the line.

All in all we got pretty good results in just a couple of days, and developed a good plan for continuing with the improvement and assuring manufacturing excellence. MT

Ron Moore is managing partner of The RM Group, Inc., 12024 Broadwood Dr., Knoxville, TN 37922, and author of "Making Common Sense Common Practice: Models for Manufacturing Excellence" as well as numerous journal articles on manufacturing excellence. He can be reached at (865) 675-7647.

The intent of these words has long been familiar to the reliability and maintenance community. What has been added are the words "Six Sigma."

Originated by Motorola, Six Sigma took hold in a big way in the early 1990s. The focus was reducing variation in manufacturing processes. This was key for the semiconductor industry in its race to stay ahead of the Japanese. Companies such as Compaq, Intel, and Texas Instruments made great strides in manufacturing productivity. Along came the conglomerate giants such as ABB, AlliedSignal, and GE. Six Sigma is demonstrated to be an effective productivity and cash generator for aerospace, automotive, electrical, chemicals, plastics, and others.

As we began the 2000s, Six Sigma found new "processes" to fix: transactional, design, marketing, and new partnerships in Lean and supply chain. Now we are seeing Black Belts birthed in nonmanufacturing business segments; transportation and financial are among the industries using Six Sigma to enhance productivity.

But wait a minute—is Six Sigma in manufacturing fully matured? Are these Black Belts and Green Belts becoming more a "minimum expectation" in manufacturing? I think the answer is "yes" with one exception. Manufacturing will NOT achieve Five Sigma, let alone Six Sigma, for its internal operations unless it realizes the value of Six Sigma in asset dependability. It's been my experience that the petroleum and chemicals sectors have recognized the value of predictable, stable operations in which asset dependability has played an important role. But have they truly achieved Six Sigma performance in the reliability and maintenance processes? I'm referring to the work processes: dependability in capital design, stores, planning and scheduling, hazardous work permitting, outside support services, reliability methods, work execution, etc.

With perhaps the exception of the aforementioned semiconductor manufacturing sector, my experience with discrete manufacturing has revealed very little regard for the value of asset dependability. The environment is predominantly reactive. Operations has little patience for preventive maintenance. There is hardly a whisper of predictive or proactive maintenance, and reliability engineering is virtually unheard of. Work processes hardly exist. Operations operates and when it fails, maintenance repairs.

Interestingly, these companies are spending tremendous dollars and resources in people, training, and improving the sigma level of their suppliers. Why do these companies all but ignore their assets' variation in reliability, and the work processes to ensure on-going performance predictability? How can manufacturers espouse to becoming Lean when their continuous flow is interrupted by unplanned equipment downtime?

After seeing the data and talking to some of the leaders, I am convinced the answer is "they don't get it." There is a tremendous paradigm that assets are there at the whim of operations, and maintenance is "staffed to react." Data reveals their overall equipment effectiveness (OEE) capability to be less than 60 percent on average. Best-in-class petroleum and chemical operations have OEE in the 90 percent plus range. Benchmark for discrete operations, I am told but I haven't seen it yet, is 85 percent. Discrete operations have a greater degree of labor cost intensity than continuous processes.

If OEEs were driven to 85 percent, discrete operations could eliminate overtime and even eliminate a second or third shift of operation per week. If business is great, the company can achieve more capacity out of its existing equipment. This seems so obvious, but the folks leading the discrete operations typically don't have a clue concerning their OEE capability.

If your company is truly committed to the Six Sigma philosophy, it needs to get on board with asset dependability as a key component. Even if your company is not going down the Six Sigma path, you should consider carefully that these skills are becoming more the rule to the profession than in the past where the "chosen few" were tapped to become Black Belts. My company offers Six Sigma specialization in asset dependability, as may others in the future. My promise is that you will look at your job and the world of productivity through a new set of lenses if you elect to certify as a Six Sigma Green Belt or Black Belt. MT

Robert C. Baldwin, CMRP, Editor

Your answer probably mirrors one of those offered by the audience. But the perception Hiemstra drove home to us is that we live in the eternal present (which consists of constant change) and that the future is just behind us breathing down the backs of our necks.

His talk drew attention to patterns in our behavior and provided a fresh perspective on where we might be headed. He spoke of revolutions: how they progress (like popcorn in the microwave—starting slow and building to a crescendo), the electro-mechanical revolution just past, and the techno-social-economic revolution that we are in the midst of.

The three technologies of the current revolution, which he sees exploding over the next 20 years, are digital, biotechnical, and nanotechnical. The digital aspects of this revolution were congruent with Wonderware's view of the future, which includes extensive use of automation and control technologies, data and information technologies, and condition monitoring and plant asset management technologies.

Speaking of the digital explosion, Hiemstra alluded to inventor Ray Kurzweil's writings suggesting that the $1000 that buys the computing power of an insect brain today, may buy the computing power of a mouse brain by 2010, and perhaps the computing power of a human brain by 2020.

Impossible? Hiemstra reminds us that many things that are impossible today will be possible tomorrow, just as many things that are possible today, were formerly impossible.

I was still pumped up about the future weeks after hearing Hiemstra. Then I had an opportunity to talk with a friend, the former head of an award-winning maintenance organization that delivered 94 percent uptime with 65 percent planned maintenance, who left the organization a number of years ago to pursue other opportunities. He mentioned current performance at his old plant: it was on its second CMMS since he left, had slipped back into reactive maintenance, and is cannibalizing its equipment for spare parts.

What a reality check. But it is in keeping with Hiemstra's closing remarks that "the future is something you do." In some cases it is back to the future, strengthening the fundamentals of reliability, and in some cases it is forward into the past, sliding back toward reactive maintenance, which reminds me of Hiemstra's key point: Your image of the future drives current action. MT